Distributed quantum communication and quantum computing offer many new opportunities for quantum information processing. Here networks based on highly nonlocal quantum resources with complex entanglement structures have been proposed for distributing, sharing and processing quantum information. Graph states in particular have emerged as powerful resources for such tasks using measurement-based techniques. We report an experimental demonstration of graph-state quantum secret sharing, an important primitive for a quantum network. We use an alloptical setup to encode quantum information into photons representing a five-qubit graph state. We are able to reliably encode, distribute and share quantum information between four parties. In our experiment we demonstrate the integration of three distinct secret sharing protocols, which allow for security and protocol parameters not possible with any single protocol alone. Our results show that graph states are a promising approach for sophisticated multi-layered protocols in quantum networks.
Introduction
The potential benefits of quantum information processing in a connected world are now well established: while the algorithmic speedups offered by quantum computers 1 and the security provided by quantum key distribution 2 are outstanding improvements over what is classically achievable, in recent years many new protocols have emerged in the setting of quantum networks 3 . Examples of these protocols include quantum coin flipping [4] [5] [6] [7] , blind quantum computation 8, 9 and distributed and secure quantum computation 10, 11 . In this work we investigate the important networking protocol of quantum secret sharing 12,13 -which allows one party to distribute a secret (classical or quantum) to a network of parties, such that only authorised sets of parties can access the secret and unauthorised sets obtain no information. Secret sharing has many applications in network-based scenarios, such as auctioning, remote voting, money transfer and multiparty secure computation.
The first classical protocols for secret sharing were introduced in 1979 by Shamir 14 and Blakely 15 , with quantum versions later developed using quantum channels for sharing both classical and quantum secrets 12, 13 . Most recently, however, secret sharing protocols have been unified under the framework of graph states [16] [17] [18] -quantum resources that can be used to share both classical and quantum secrets. One of the most promising features of graph-state based quantum secret sharing is the natural capacity of the resource states to be integrated into more complex networking protocols. Indeed, graph states are also the basis for universal measurementbased quantum computation [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] , error correction [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] and blind quantum computation 8, 9 , making them versatile resources for distributed quantum information processing.
In this work we report an experimental demonstration of graph-state based sharing of classical and quantum secrets using photons in a linear optics setup.
We show how a five-qubit graph state can be used for sharing a classical secret amongst four parties using quantum channels (CQ) -secure against a distrusted channel between the dealer (the party that shares the secret) and the four parties.
We also outline and demonstrate three protocols of increasing sophistication that allow the same five-qubit graph state to be used to share a quantum secret with quantum channels (QQ). By combining the classical Shamir-Blakely protocols 14, 15 with CQ and schemes for sharing quantum secrets recently introduced in refs. 16, 17, 32 we demonstrate the sharing of a quantum secret over an access structure impossible with QQ alone, which is certified as secure against distrusted channels between the dealer and the other parties (also impossible with QQ alone). We thus demonstrate the practical potential of graph-state quantum secret sharing, as well as the capacity for integrating several cryptographic protocols in this setting. Previous experiments on quantum secret sharing have concentrated on sharing classical secrets [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] , with some work regarding the sharing of quantum secrets amongst three players [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] .
However, our work goes beyond these previous works in two crucial aspects. First, the quantum secret sharing is performed using graph states, which are of great importance for the integration of secret sharing with a wide range of quantum networking protocols via the measurement-based paradigm. Second, we have combined three different cryptographic protocols, one classical and two quantum to enable the sharing of a quantum secret which would not have been possible with any one of the protocols alone, thus demonstrating the ability of graph states to allow the hybridisation of classical and quantum protocols. The results of our experimental demonstration and their analysis show some of the key advantages of using graph states for quantum communication protocols in future quantum networks.
and V referring to horizontal and vertical polarization. The entangled photons are generated at non-degenerate signal and idler wavelengths of 625nm and 860nm. A second PCF generates heralded single photons at the signal wavelength (see Methods). Both PCF sources were pumped by the same pulsed laser. The signal photons from the two PCF sources were then overlapped at a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS) to perform a postselected fusion operation 44 , leaving a three-photon entangled GHZ (|0 ± |1 ) are encoded as diagonal and anti-diagonal plane polarizations.
These 45
• rotations are applied to the two signal photons emerging from the PBS fusion operation using half-wave plates (HWP). up to local complementation operations 43 , which are carried out using additional waveplates and a relabelling of the interferometer paths to the Pauli X basis (see Methods). The five-qubit graph state generated in the experiment and shown in Figure 1 b is given explicitly by
where the eigenstates of the Pauli Y operator are
To measure the path qubit in the Pauli X basis, one path or the other is blocked inside the interferometer. To measure in the Y or Z basis, the paths are allowed to recombine at the BS surface with different relative phases. The polarization qubits are then measured using quarter-wave plate (QWP) -HWP -PBS chains, followed by silicon avalanche photodiode detectors (APDs), which enable any Pauli basis measurement to be performed 45 .
We first checked the entanglement of the graph state using an entanglement witness 46 . In this case, it is possible to detect genuine multipartite entanglement (GME) in a linear cluster state using the correlations from only two local measurement bases. Since the five-qubit graph state is locally equivalent to a five-qubit linear cluster state, by making corresponding changes to the reference frames of the measurements we obtain the relevant witness (see Methods). The measurements are
, which lead to a witness value of W = −0.15±0.03.
The error is calculated using a Monte Carlo method with Poissonian noise on the count statistics 45 . The negative expectation value of the witness reveals the presence of GME and confirms that all qubits are involved in the generation of the graph state. We also obtain the fidelity of the experimental graph state with respect to the ideal case using seventeen measurement bases (see Methods) and find a fidelity of F = 0.70 ± 0.01.
Having characterised the resource state, we move on to testing its performance in carrying out secret sharing protocols. We consider qubit 0 to belong to the dealer, and qubits 1, 2, 3 and 4 to players 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. It can be seen from Eq. (1) that the graph state is a maximally entangled state between the dealer and the players. Thus, its use for secret sharing can be thought of as analogous to the way a maximally entangled state is used for two player communication. When using it to share a classical secret, a random key can be established between the dealer and authorised sets of players, similar to entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) 32 . On the other hand, when using it to share a quantum secret it can be thought of as the entangled resource for teleporting a secret state from the dealer to the players. In both cases the shape of the graph state imposes restrictions on which sets of players can access the secret, giving the overall access structure for the secret sharing.
Classical secret sharing (CQ)
In the CQ protocol the graph state in Eq. (1) is used to establish a random key which can be known only by the dealer and an authorised set of players 12, 16 . In this sense it is similar to a secret key generation protocol: once the key is established it can be used to securely communicate between the dealer and the authorised set of players, even in the presence of eavesdroppers (making it an improvement on the Shamir-Blakely schemes 14, 15 , which require trusted channels). We will see that it also can be used as a subprotocol for secure QQ. As in entanglement based QKD, the players both measure in randomly chosen complementary bases, the correlations are then checked, and if sufficiently high the key can be trusted. 
Thus, the dealer's measurement projects the players' state into one of four states The dealer's result is used as the secret key and the task of the players is to make measurements to discriminate the states ρ i,j 1234 and find i. They cannot do this perfectly without knowledge of the basis choice j, so they make choices based on a guess j for the basis used by the dealer. As in standard QKD, after the players measure their state, the basis choice j is announced by the dealer. If the players' measurements were chosen differently, i.e. j = j, the results are discarded and a sifted key is built up using the cases where the bases of the dealer and the players coincided. For a given basis choice j, a set of players is 'unauthorised' if there is no measurement they can make to find i, and a set of players is 'authorised' if they are able to perfectly find i using a particular choice of measurement. Further details of the protocol and proof of security can be found in refs. 16, 32 .
To check whether a set of players B using the five-qubit graph state can access the secret it is necessary to look at their reduced states ρ i,j B given the dealer's result i and basis choice j. For a particular basis j, the dealer is essentially encoding the classical information about their result i into the state ρ i,j B , chosen with probability p i,j -the probability the dealer obtains result i when measuring basis j. We denote this encoding of classical information as j . To quantify how well a set of players can access the dealer's results we then use the accessible information
where S(ρ) is the von Neuman entropy of state ρ and ρ That is, their reduced density matrix is independent of the dealer's result i, for both bases j. In Figure 2 we have measured the reduced density matrices for each player (for each of the dealer's results) from the graph state generated in our experiment to obtain the accessible information χ. One can see from Figure 
. It is not difficult to see that for p = 50% the accessible information will be zero, irrespective of ρ to establish a secure random key 2 . We obtain 14 ± 2%, 16 ± 2%, 18 ± 2% and readout of the path qubit, and the other to control the setting and readout of the polarization qubit.
In summary, using the graph state generated in our setup to share classical information via quantum channels (CQ) we have demonstrated a secret sharing scheme where a secret is distributed across four players such that any three can access the secret and any single player obtains no information. This is known as a ramp scheme with parameters (3, 1, 4). Here, a ramp scheme (k, k , n) enables the parameterising of any secret sharing scheme over n players such that any set of k or more players have perfect access to the secret and any set of k or fewer players have no access to the secret. If k = k − 1, then the scheme is called a (k, n) threshold scheme.
Quantum secret sharing (QQ)
We now show that our generated graph state can also be used to implement a (3,1,4) ramp scheme for sharing a quantum secret using the method described in ref. 16 . Furthermore, we also show how this ramp scheme can be upgraded to a (3, 4) threshold scheme via hybrid quantum secret sharing (using both classical and quantum secret sharing) 48, 49 . That is, any three players can access the quantum secret, but any fewer cannot. This is known to be impossible using a qubit pure quantum secret sharing protocol alone, i.e. without some classical mixing 16, 32 . Finally, we introduce and demonstrate a protocol which allows the sharing of a quantum secret over untrusted quantum channels between the dealer and the players.
In the QQ protocol a quantum state |ψ = α|0 + β|1 (the quantum secret) is encoded by the dealer onto the following four-qubit state shared by the players we implement this latter more compact approach for encoding the secret. The task of a set of players is then to access the secret quantum information.
In order to quantify the amount of information that can be accessed by a set of players B we use the quantum mutual information of the reduced state shared by the dealer and the set of players, ρ 0,B 50 , which is given by
where ρ 0 and ρ B are the reduced states of the dealer and players respectively. If I(ρ 0,B ) is zero, the players obtain no information about the quantum secret. For any single player it can be shown that the encoding in Eq. (4) leads to a reduced density matrix that is maximally mixed, independent of the secret input qubit. In Figure 5 we have used quantum process tomography and treated the mapping between the dealer and each player as a quantum channel for the secret qubit to be transferred over. Here, four probe states are used for the dealer's secret qubit, |0 , |1 , |+ and (I + X ⊗ X) and 1 4 (I − X ⊗ X) for both the Z-X and X-Y planes. The oscillations between the fixed orthogonal states show that some information about the dealer's qubit remains in the joint state of two players and depends on the plane the qubit is encoded into. We quantify the amount of information in this adjacent pair using the mutual information of the state shared by the dealer and the pair, measuring a value of I = 0.29 ± 0.02. This value is obtained from a three-qubit state tomography. On the other hand, when the players are opposite they obtain no information in the Z-X plane, but can extract information in the Z-Y and X-Y planes. In Figure 6 g-i we show the experimental results from the player pair (1,2).
In Figure 6 h the fixed state is 1 4 (I + X ⊗ X) for the Z-X plane, while in Figure 6 g and i, the fixed states are the orthogonal states To elevate the secret sharing QQ scenario to a threshold scheme, i.e. one where no two players can obtain any information, we use a hybrid protocol 48, 49 . In this class of protocols, any (k, k , n) ramp scheme can be elevated to a (k, n) threshold scheme, and in fact all intermediate ramp schemes (k, k , n) for any k ≤ k ≤ k − 1 can be achieved. In our case we can elevate the (3,1,4) ramp scheme to a (3,4) threshold scheme. The hybrid scheme uses, in addition to the QQ ramp scheme, a quantum one-time pad and classical secret sharing. That is, before the encoding the dealer applies a randomly chosen Pauli operation so that the state encoded is X x Z z |ψ , where x, z are randomly chosen bits by the dealer. This state is then encoded and distributed, and the classical information x, z is shared using classical secret sharing with ramp scheme parameters (k, k , n). Without the classical information the players will never be able to retrieve |ψ , but with the classical information, any k can still access the information perfectly. In the present case, if the classical information is distributed using a classical (2, 4) secret sharing scheme, no two players can know its value. We check the performance of the hybrid protocol experimentally by applying randomly the operators I, X, Z and XZ to the dealer's qubit and measuring the resulting state of the pairs of players. In Figure 6 d-f we show the fidelity of the adjacent player's shared state with respect to the fixed state I/4 and in Figure 6 j-l we show the fidelity of the opposite player's shared state with respect to the fixed state respectively, the graph state is projected to one where the quantum secret resides on the qubit of player 1 (up to a correction operation X s 2 (ZX) s 4 Z). The same is possible for any three players by symmetry. Thus, for the QQ protocol all three sets can access the secret. The same is true for the hybrid protocol, since the classical information of the one-time pad will be known by any set of three players and can easily be undone. In Figure 7 we show the results from our generated graph state when the set of players (1,2,4) and (2,3,4) work to uncover the secret qubit shared by the dealer. Here, the designated player who retrieves the secret qubit is player 1 in Figure 7 a and player 4 in Figure 7 b. We again treat the mapping from the dealer to the designated player as a quantum channel and carry out quantum process tomography. One can see that in both sets of three players the secret quantum information is retrieved, although with some deformation of the Bloch sphere caused by the non-ideal graph state used in our experiment. However, the average fidelity for the shared qubit remains high withF 1 = 0.82 ± 0.01 and
Secure quantum secret sharing (SQQ)
Finally, we introduce and demonstrate a new protocol for sharing a quantum secret over untrusted channels between the dealer and the players, which we denote by SQQ (for secure QQ). This is performed here for a (3, 4) threshold scheme, its extension to general access structures will be presented in ref. 51 . The QQ protocol and the hybrid protocol work as long as the state used for encoding is the same as (or close to) that given in Eq. (1). However, if the channel from the dealer to the players is noisy or untrusted, this may not be the case. Thus, without knowing the initial secret that was sent, an authorised set of players cannot verify if they received it correctly or not. The SQQ protocol rectifies this problem by verifying that the state used is indeed that in Eq. (1), or close to it. Here, CQ measurements are used as a subprotocol to test the resource state (in a similar way to how a GHZ state can be tested using the verification protocol recently presented in ref. 52 ).
The protocol works as follows: after generating and distributing the state, the dealer decides either to test it, or use it for quantum secret sharing, with probability s and 1 − s, respectively. The dealer announces the choice about whether to test or use it publicly, and the dealer and players carry out their part of the test or the secret sharing scheme, respectively. The test is essentially an adapted version of the CQ protocol, which by checking the correlations verifies the state is the one desired. In the test, the dealer measures in either X, Y or Z, or does not make any measurement, all with equal probability. They then announce their choice and the results publicly. A set of players B which are checking the state, then do measurements depending on the dealer's measurement choice. The measurements used by the sets of three players are explicitly detailed below, along with a description of how the level of security is quantified.
It can be shown (see Methods) that if a given state ρ shared between the dealer and players is used for secret sharing and the state ω that is retrieved by an authorised set of players has fidelity f = ψ|ω|ψ with respect to the secret state |ψ , then the probability P that the state ρ passes the CQ test is related to the fidelity by
In other words, a state which passes the test with high probability will give a high fidelity when used for sharing the secret.
Furthermore, if we call C f the event that the protocol has not aborted and that the state ρ was used for QQ, then we also show in the Methods that the probability P (C f ) of this event satisfies f ≥ 1 − 2s
. Thus, if the test is passed in the cases when the dealer announces they should test, then the players can be confident that when the dealer announces they should instead use the state, the secret quantum information retrieved will be of high fidelity.
As an example for our experimental graph state, we consider the set of players (1, 2, 3), with the same holding for all sets by symmetry. The measurements for the test correspond to randomly measuring one of the following operators
The test is passed if the measurement results for these operators are +1, +1, +1, −1, −1, +1 and −1, respectively. Based on the measured expectation values for these operator settings, in Figure 8 a we show the probability of our experimental state passing the test and in Figure 8 b we show the corresponding lower bounds on the fidelity, which are consistent with the fidelities measured previously in Figure 7 .
Thus, using the verified protocol we find that the probability of passing the test is fully consistent with the previously measured fidelity of the retrieved states for the three players.
Discussion
In this work we experimentally demonstrated the use of multipartite entangled graph states for classical (CQ) and quantum (QQ) secret sharing. We used a photonic setup to generate a five-qubit graph state and carried out the encoding, sharing and retrieval of classical and quantum secrets. In the CQ protocol we demonstrated the ability of the graph to share a classical random key, which can be used to securely share classical secrets, with an access structure of a (3, 1, 4) ramp scheme.
Here, the secret is shared between four players, such that any three can perfectly access the secret, yet no single player obtains any information at all. The QQ protocol achieves the same access structure for a quantum secret. However, with the integration of classical and quantum protocols, this access structure was then elevated to a (3, 4) threshold scheme for sharing a quantum secret, i.e. any three players can access the secret, but fewer have no information. This hybrid QQ protocol is a combination of classical secret sharing and the QQ protocol, which allows us to achieve an access structure known to be impossible with QQ alone. We also introduced and demonstrated a new protocol for sharing a quantum secret over untrusted channels, which we call SQQ. Taken together with the hybrid QQ protocol this highlights the power of integrating tasks using the graph state approach and enables us to achieve protocol parameters and security not possible with any single protocol. As more sophisticated ways of using graph states emerge, combining and demonstrating different sub-protocols in the way we have done here will become increasingly more relevant. The facility and flexibility of graph states for different quantum information processing tasks clearly propels them forward as a technology with great potential for future quantum networks.
Methods

Experimental setup
The PCF sources used in the experiment are similar to those described in refs. 53, 54 .
When pumped by picosecond pulses from a Ti:Sapphire laser at 724nm on the slow birefringent axis of the PCF, spontaneous four-wave mixing produces signal-idler photon pairs at 625nm and 860nm, polarized on the fast axis of the fibre. The crosspolarized phasematching scheme takes advantage of a turning point in the signal wavelength where it is locally independent of the pump wavelength, which has the effect of avoiding correlations between the signal and idler's spectra. This allows quantum interference to take place between photons from separate sources without the need for tight spectral filtering, which would reduce the collection efficiency.
To produce signal-idler pairs in a polarization Bell state, the PCF is set up in a Sagnac loop around a PBS and pumped in both directions. The axes of the fibre are twisted so that in the clockwise direction around the loop, the photon pairs polarized on the fast-axis emerge horizontally polarized, while for the counter-clockwise direction, photon-pairs emerge vertically polarized. When the two directions are recombined at the PBS, all the photon-pairs exit through the same output, so that the state of a single pair in this beam is in a superposition
, where the phase θ between the two directions can be tuned to zero using a birefringent compensator placed in the pump beam before the loop.
The other PCF source is pumped in a single direction so as to produce pairs without polarization entanglement. The idler is detected as a heralding photon while the signal photon is rotated to diagonal polarization
. This is then overlapped at the fusion PBS with the signal photon from the other source and we postselect events for the cases where one signal emerges from each PBS output. This implies that the two signal photons have the same polarization, or are in an even parity state, so that they have either both been transmitted or both been reflected at the PBS. The conditioned state is a three photon GHZ
, which is converted to a linear graph state
(|+0+ + |−1− ) by waveplate rotations applied to the signal modes.
Each signal photon is then launched into a displaced Sagnac interferometer.
Here, they are split at the PBS surface of the hybrid beamsplitters, and we label the transmitted paths the |0 states of the path qubits, and the reflected paths the |1 states. This results in the five-qubit state:
|00 pol,path + |11 pol,path s1 |0 i1 |00 path,pol + |11 path,pol s2
|00 pol,path − |11 pol,path s1 |1 i1 |00 path,pol − |11 path,pol s2 ,
which is locally equivalent to a linear graph state and the target resource state, which can be written as: In order to experimentally implement the removal or tracing out of a path qubit (corresponding player does not take part in the secret sharing), the glass plate was removed from one path, so that the two path-lengths would differ by more than a coherence length. Hence the paths are incoherently recombined at the BS surface before going to polarization analysis. This allowed the photon's polarization to still be detected, but no information was gained about the path. On the other hand, to remove a polarization qubit, the PBS was taken away from the polarization analysis, so that the path information was still detected, but no polarization information was measured.
The two-fold coincidence rates collected from individual sources were around 9000 per second. Four-fold coincidences where the fusion succeeded, between the three entangled photons and the one herald photon, were ∼ 0.25 per second. Generating entanglement relies upon the signal photons from separate sources being indistingishable when they are overlapped at the PBS, otherwise the fusion can only leave an incoherent mix of possibilities 44 . When the relative arrival time of the signal photons was varied, with the measurement bases set appropriately, an anti-dip was seen at zero-delay with visibility ∼ 62%. This indicates there are some distinguishability issues which will degrade the quality of the state, which mainly result from inhomogenity along the length of the PCF sources.
Resource characterisation
For the five-qubit graph state we use the following entanglement witness on qubits 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4
whereÕ corresponds to measurements in the O basis with the eigenstates swapped.
This is a locally rotated version of the witness given in ref. 46 for a five-qubit linear cluster state and takes into account the required local complementation operations 43 .
To obtain the fidelity for the five-qubit graph state we decompose the fidelity operator into a summation of products of Pauli matrices as 
Quantum secret sharing
Here we derive the access structure of the QQ protocol. The first step in the protocol is that the dealer generates and distributes the state in Eq. (1). We rewrite the state as follows
This is used to teleport a secret state |ψ = α|0 + β|1 to the players. The dealer measures the secret qubit and their part of the state in Eq. (11) in the Bell basis and announces the results publicly. In the retrieval step the authorised sets then apply the appropriate correction and the decoding operations. To study the accessibility of the quantum information we ignore the correction step and assume it is always the good result where no correction is required -if a set of players cannot access the secret for the corrected state, then they cannot access it for the uncorrected state.
Similarly, if they can, knowing the results of the dealer's measurement allows them to do the correction afterwards. Thus, consider the secret teleported to the players, giving the state
Note that this state is cyclically symmetric amongst the four players, according to the symmetry of the graph, in this case a square. It can be seen from Eq. (12) that any single player a has the reduced density matrix ρ a = I/2, thus they cannot access any information. This is quantified by considering the reduced state of Eq. (11) for ρ 0a = I/4, so that the mutual information I(ρ 0a ) = 0.
For two adjacent players a and b we have from Eq. (12)
From this we find that they can obtain some information as follows: player a mea- On the other hand, after teleportation two opposite players a and b share the state
where 
Hybrid Quantum secret sharing
After the random application of the operators I, X, Z and XZ based on the results of a one-time pad, as well as the QQ encoding teleportation stage, the state of the players is
where
From the arguments in the previous section, players who cannot access the quantum secret in the QQ case cannot access it in this case too. However, players also cannot access anything when they do not know the values x and z. This can be checked by looking at the reduced density matrices mixed over the values of x and z. Thus, any two players not knowing
x and z obtain no information, but any three knowing x and z can access the secret state perfectly. Sharing the classical information of x and z via a (3, 4)
Shamir-Blakely 14,15 classical secret sharing scheme achieves this exactly. Note, we are assuming authenticated classical channels, as in all our schemes. However, to use the Shamir-Blakely 14,15 secret sharing scheme one also requires a trusted channel.
If one does not trust the classical channels one could use a CQ scheme to send this information, or indeed the Shamir-Blakely scheme plus multiple standard two party QKD.
Secure quantum secret sharing details
We now present the verified SQQ protocol and its proof in more detail. We exemplify the protocol for our state with accessing set B = (1, 2, 3). The same steps can be performed by symmetry for all sets of three players.
1. The dealer distributes the players' qubits of the entangled graph state, i.e.
the channel state in Eq. (1).
2. The dealer randomly decides that they will carry out: (a) the protocol CQ to measure I 0 they output the result +1).
The minus signs can be interpreted as meaning that the product of outputs should ideally be minus one.
ii. To comply, players in B perform their parts of the measurement chosen by the dealer. They then check their correlations by communicating amongst themselves. If the product of outcomes of the dealer and all B is 1 (or −1 according to the sign of the measurement), they give the response "pass", otherwise "fail".
iii. If "pass" is returned, proceed again to step 1 of the protocol, otherwise abort. ii. Players B perform the corrections and decoding operation.
We now give a proof of the security for the QSS protocol, i. 
where Γ = (|g 0123 g|
is the projection onto a space where the QQ protocol works perfectly, and |g 0123 is the graph state of the subgraph of qubits 0, 1, 2 and 3. The probability P of passing the CQ test , given a state ρ, is then given by
Consider ρ is now used instead to share a quantum secret |ψ via the QQ protocol. If we denote f = ψ|ω|ψ the fidelty of the decoded state ω, then it follows that f ≥ Tr(ρΓ), since any state in the subspace Γ perfectly transports the secret, so the final fidelity can only be higher than the overlap with this space, giving Eq. (6).
Following the logic in ref. 52 , if we denote C f the event that the certified protocol has not aborted and that the state ρ was used for QQ such that it returns a decoded state with fidelity f with the original secret, then it can be shown that the probability P (C f ) of this event satisfies
This implies that if the test passes, then the fidelity of the output state is high.
This relationship is demonstrated in the results section. A generalisation of this protocol, with a more detailed and general proof can be found in ref. 51 . (|H i 2 |H s 2 + |V i 2 |V s 2 ). The signal photons from the first pair are rotated to the state |+ using a half-wave plate (HWP) and both signal photons are then fused using a polarizing beamsplitter. The polarizations of the signal photons are then rotated using HWPs to form the three-qubit linear cluster state (I + X ⊗ X) (red) and 1 4 (I − X ⊗ X) (blue). In h, j, k and l, the fixed state is 1 4 (I + X ⊗ X). In g and i, the fixed states are the orthogonal states 
